A ‘One-Time’ Wealth Tax? What Supporters’ Own Research Says About Proposition 40

On Tuesday, Californians will vote on Proposition 40, which is a measure to introduce a 5% wealth tax on billionaires in the state. Proposition 40 would make California the only state in the US to impose a broad wealth tax.

This would be a notable departure from recent trends. In the early 1990s, many European countries had broad-based wealth taxes, but only 3 remain today. They are also unpopular among economists: A 2019 survey of senior academic economists indicated substantial agreement that wealth taxes are much more difficult to enforce than existing US taxes. Respondents also agreed by about a 2:1 margin that reforming existing taxes would better achieve the stated goals of a wealth tax. These trends reflect longstanding concerns that wealth taxes tend to raise little revenue, are complex to administer, negatively affect investment, and induce wealthy residents to leave.

UC Berkeley Economists Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman are leading proponents of Proposition 40 and have long advocated for wealth taxes in the US. Six Economics Nobel laureates have also supported it: Daron Acemoglu, Abhijit Banerjee, Peter Diamond, Esther Duflo, Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz. In an open letter, they argued that a “one-time” tax would raise about $100 billion in revenue, claiming the retrospective design means there is minimal risk of billionaires avoiding it by leaving California. At the same time, they say they hope its passage would “kickstart a movement to tax ultra-high-net-worth individuals in other states”, a juxtaposition that is hard to reconcile with the idea that this is a “one-time” tax.

One immediately puzzling thing about the list of economists who support this bill is that many have a history of pointing out critical flaws in wealth taxes. For example, Saez and Diamond argued in a 2011 article that:

“Without a credible commitment (which may not be possible), confiscatory wealth taxation would adversely affect saving behavior and have serious efficiency costs because of concerns that such taxation will return.”

As Saez and Diamond acknowledged, even a one-time tax can change behavior if it creates an expectation that further one-time taxes will be adopted in the future. Yet the signatories provide no reason why rational individuals should not expect the tax to be quickly repeated beyond their personal reassurances.

Similarly, Stiglitz pointed out in 2012 (speaking about a proposed annual one percent wealth tax) that even wealth taxes that sound modest on paper can tax away 100% of capital returns. “Nobody can want that”, he said. And yet the current proposed levy is much greater than one percent.

Looking back on some of the most influential research by these signatories, we actually find many reasons why it is hard to justify a wealth tax. For example, a 1976 article by Stiglitz, along with Anthony Atkinson, has served as a benchmark for the profession ever since. Applied to the taxation of wealth and savings, it states conditions under which it is inefficient to tax savings. This is because a tax on savings penalizes effort just like a tax on labor income, but also unnecessarily distorts investment decisions.

The “Atkinson-Stiglitz” theorem is, of course, just a benchmark. Many justifications have been proposed as grounds for taxing savings. These include practical difficulties in distinguishing income from labor versus capital, which makes it hard to set different rates for each; uncertainty and insurance motives; and differences in the saving behavior of the rich. Nonetheless, economists tend to agree that tax rates on capital should be low to minimize unnecessary discouragement of saving and investment.

We already tax the returns to capital. Proposition 40 is unusual because it aims to tax the stock of wealth rather than the return to saving. These are similar in many ways, but it helps to think about the differences. First, even low annual taxes on the stock of wealth can amount to high effective tax rates on the return on savings, as Stiglitz notes above. Suppose capital earns a nominal return of 5% p.a. and inflation averages 2%. Combined with existing federal and CA taxes on capital gains, a wealth tax of just 1% a year produces an effective tax rate on the return to savings of over 90%. Second, as Wojciech Kopczuk argues in a response to one of Saez and Zucman’s papers, it is not at all obvious that taxing wealth is better than taxing its return. In fact, there are good reasons why the opposite might be true. This includes the fact that a tax on returns better targets abnormally high returns that come from economic rents such as monopoly power, the dilution of a founder’s control of their company, and administrative complexity.

Many people believe, albeit to different degrees, that it is desirable to tax the incomes of the rich and use the revenue both to provide public services and support those in society who are less fortunate. A core lesson from economic theory is that to whatever extent one wants to do this — which reasonable people may disagree about — any such redistribution should be done efficiently. Even if you care disproportionately about the poorest in society, we should tax the rich efficiently. Consider Arthur Okun’s thought experiment of a “leaky” bucket, in which we want to transfer resources from richer to poorer individuals, but the bucket leaks. If we can fix the leak or reduce its size, more resources will reach the intended recipients.

It is not obvious that it is a good idea to raise taxes in California, which is already a high-tax state. But suppose that Californians do want higher taxes and a larger government, and are choosing between a wealth tax and our normal tax instruments. Then they should ask: which is the more efficient way to do so? Returning to the 2019 survey of senior economists, they said a wealth tax was the less-effective choice.

This brings us back to the claim that Proposition 40 is a one-time tax, and so people cannot move to avoid it. This is contradicted by the fact that several high-net-worth individuals have already done so. Given the bill’s proponents’ stated hope that it will inspire a movement, it is far-fetched to think California can commit not to impose another levy in the future. Indeed, any argument supporting Proposition 40 is likely to become more tempting over time, making it entirely rational to think it will happen again. If California chooses to pluck the golden goose of billionaire wealth now, and billionaires do not leave, it will find itself in much the same situation in a few years’ time. Time for another “one-time” surprise.

It would not be surprising if wealthy individuals choose to avoid this risk. After all, we know they are highly mobile and willing to move to low-tax jurisdictions. Jaros and Rauh project that foregone income taxes when billionaires leave will cause California to lose around $39 billion in tax revenue from Proposition 40. Earlier work by Moretti and Wilson (2023) also suggests California would likely lose revenue overall from a wealth tax. Effectively, Californians would hurt themselves by lowering overall tax revenue in an effort to hurt billionaires.

Even if this levy were “one-time” and retrospective, this raises other problems. As Acemoglu put it in 2025, “a wealth tax seems to be a little bit like changing laws and applying them retrospectively”. Diamond and Saez, too, referred to a wealth tax as confiscation. Referring to wealth taxation in these terms is important, because economists have long viewed individual property rights as essential for society-wide affluence. Acemoglu has been at the forefront of research in this area. His famous paper with Simon Johnson and James Robinson asked what caused some countries to be rich when others were not. His answer? Better institutions, mostly explicitly secure property rights and protection of private investors from the risk of expropriation by governments, which provide the required security and incentive to build wealth. A retrospectively imposed wealth tax runs counter to this, as Acemoglu, Diamond, and Saez all seem to acknowledge.

Reflecting on the impressive body of research produced by these eminent economists, it is hard to see strong arguments for Proposition 40, and easy to find arguments against it. To refer again to the proponents’ own work (this time Banerjee and Duflo), economic policy is effective when grounded in high-quality evidence. Currently, however, the evidence suggests that at least some wealthy individuals have already avoided this levy, and that more will leave California — or avoid coming — in anticipation of another in the future.